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ABSTRACT 
 
Title of Dissertation: An Approach to Improve International Maritime Security 
through the Coordination between the IMO Instruments 
and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Regime 
 
Degree:      Master of Science in Maritime Affairs 
                  (Maritime Safety and Environmental Administration)  
 
This dissertation is a study on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
which is a global effort through which nations deliberately interdict carriage of illicit 
WMD-related substances commuting States and non-State actors. Given its 
flexibility as an “activity” rather than an organization, the initiative has gained 
supports from more than 102 countries since its interception in 2003. 
Now, in its 10th year, and despite boasting over 100 participants, the PSI 
continues to face legal, political, and structural challenges. By looking into the 
realities of PSI activities, the paper attempts to explore some of the key challenges, 
with its practical means of operations. 
Furthermore, the paper reviews how security-related instruments of the IMO 
have been involved in maritime transportation of WMD and related materials and 
provides recommendations that the IMO play an effective role in strengthening the 
PSI. The author concludes with sound recommendations for the IMO on ways to find 
an optimal point between maintaining the security of the ship and stopping the 
trafficking of WMD and related materials.  
 
KEY WORDS: Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Interdiction, Operational  
             Experts Group (OEG), Statement of Interdiction Principles (SIP),               
             United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS),  
             United Nations Security Council Resolutions, Weapons of Mass  
             Destruction (WMD)  
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CHAPTER 1. Introduction 
 
The nuclear nonproliferation regime’s complexity in handling 
noncompliance and preventing the unlawful use of dual-use materials is 
demonstrated by the contemporary nuclear crunch in and the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran as well as the menace of terror organizations 
utilizing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). To cope with these shortcomings, the 
United States instituted “the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) has 
focused international attention on the proliferation of WMD, including proliferation 
by maritime transport”.1 
The PSI is a global effort through which nations deliberately interdict 
carriage of illicit WMD-related substances commuting nations. In May 2003, the PSI 
was instituted by U.S. president George W. Bush who nominated its foremost eleven 
endorsing countries including the United States. 
The PSI has increased a need for interdiction because of “the growing 
number of states pursuing WMD and missile programs and the growing threat from 
the nexus between WMD and terrorism”.2 Interdiction was considered to be able to 
become a real complement by guaranteeing fulfilled responsibilities and by 
obstructing trades aiming at proliferation of WMD from one nation to another. At 
least, it would presumably stem back customers and suppliers and keep proliferation 
from being handy. Even though interdiction was a big part of the PSI, the essence of 
the initiative improved its implicational deliberation in ports and at sea.  
Nonbinding agreements have been old stories in global governance. The 
development of the PSI, nevertheless, was unique. The rules of the route to 
                                           
1 Guilfoyle, D. (2007). Maritime Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Journal of Conflict 
and Security Law Vol. 12, 13. 
2 Esper, M. T., & Allen, C. A. (2004, January 12). The PSI: Taking Action against WMD Proliferation. 
The Monitor, p. 5. 
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interdiction were not spelled out by Bush’s announcement of the PSI. Instead, by 
immediately inhibiting prospective customers and suppliers of proliferation, he 
aimed at contending with an imperious matter. And then, he let U.S. public servants 
to bolster up his manifesto. Even though either the concept or the training of WMD 
interdiction was not brand-new, its emphasis was magnified by its definite mention. 
At the beginning, a lot of observers such as autonomous experts and 
governments all around the world were doubtful about the PSI and its unenforced 
situation. Being a coalition of the willingness by nature, the PSI was criticized that it 
was a sample of striking carelessness on both lofty multilateralism and the United 
Nations (UN) from the Bush administration. 
Washington proposed that activities such as inspection for North Korean 
freight and sanctions on weaponry trades would be practicable only if Russia and the 
People's Republic of China respond submissively. However, Russia and China 
especially “might be reluctant to sanction a de facto blockade, technically an act of 
war,”3 of the DPRK. It was natural that the DPRK did the same claiming that it 
could suppose all of PSI action against itself to be a conduct of war. Because the 
North Korean nuclear program posed a continuous security threat to Northeast Asia, 
the U.S. started urging the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to patronize 
the principles of PSI. 
It is suggested by the performance of PSI that, in order to push forward with 
hasty global support for vital international maritime security troubles, a non-binding 
initiative may be functional. The initiative has been adopted to nourish recreated 
nonproliferation initiatives, led to international legal outgrowth, and mobilized 
cooperative nonproliferation activities. Approval among governments and 
autonomous analysts has replaced initial resistance to the PSI almost beyond 
recognition; informal and flexible nature of the PSI makes itself a valuable 
supplement to formal methods. Likewise, it has been powerful in forming novel 
                                           
3 Bandow, D. (2006, October 10). Defang North Korea: Let Beijing Take the Lead. The National 
Interest. 
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global legitimate schemes—the sanctions-specific resolutions of Iran and DPRK, UN 
Resolution 1540, and the Suppression of Unauthorized Acts (SUA) Protocol of 2005 
and the Beijing Convention; indeed, the PSI developed all of them. 
There has been, however, depression since the PSI’s early golden days. The 
PSI has been blamed for impeding legal trade, being politically fomenting, lack of 
transparency, and for all these reasons, having confined effectiveness.  
The following analysis aims to review the current challenges facing the PSI 
in a variety of ways and to give sound recommendations for the IMO on ways to find 
an optimal point between maintaining the security of the ship and stopping the 
carriage of illicit WMD and associated substances. For theses aims, the dissertation 
proceeds in five chapters. Chapter two provides an overview of the background and 
development of the PSI and an analysis of the principles of the initiative. In Chapter 
three, major activities of the PSI and its practical means of operations are provided. 
Chapter four examines legal, political, and structural challenges the PSI is facing. 
Chapter five reviews how security-related instruments of the IMO have been 
involved in maritime transportation of WMD and related materials and provides 
recommendations that the IMO play an effective role in strengthening the PSI. Lastly, 
the concluding Chapter six provides a conclusion of this dissertation with an 
expectation that the IMO, standing with the PSI, will be able to contribute toward 
international maritime security. 
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CHAPTER 2. An Overview of Proliferation Security Initiative 
 
2.1 Purpose 
The Proliferation Security Initiative is an instrument for promoting States’ 
practical cooperation and assuring the political commitment of them, in order to 
contend with the transfer of WMD, their shipment networks, and related materials 
crossing over countries. The PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles (SIP) defines 
and guides the PSI’s activity. As it says on the SIP (See Appendix A for the full text 
of SIP), the PSI has been developed to close a gap in the common non-proliferation 
system and as a method to defy the “increasingly aggressive efforts by proliferators 
to stand outside or to circumvent existing nonproliferation norms, and to profit from 
such trade”.4 The responsibility of the PSI fundamentally sits upon a shoulder of 
every State which endeavors to control the trade in wares related to WMD. 
 
 
2.2 Background 
Being a dependent initiative, the PSI builds on wide attempts by the 
international community using available conventions and regimes. The event 
happened on December 9, 2002 is extensively believed to have triggered the 
threshold of the PSI. The United States enlisted the Spanish Navy in stopping and 
boarding a North Korean vessel, the So San; this incident was “a very successful 
coalition interdiction effort that took place in the Arabian Sea … We (the U.S.) 
became aware of the departure of a ship from North Korea that was carrying what we 
believed to be weapons of concern. This was a non-flagged vessel”.5 The ship, 
therefore, was a target of being boarded and interdicted by naval vessels in open 
                                           
4 Statement of Interdiction Principles (appendix A), preface (para. 1). 
5 Ari Fleischer, Press Briefing, White House Office of the Press Secretary, December 11, 2002. 
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waters. Soon, however, it was verified that the missiles, warheads, and chemical 
propellant were part of a lawful sale from North Korea to Yemen and that there was 
not any legal basis for detaining the ship or taking over the consignment. In fact, if 
ascertaining the flag State of the ship was the legal basis for boarding, it is difficult to 
excuse a search of the ship’s hold to support in verifying the flag State. The vessel 
was subsequently allowed to continue and deliver the consignment to Yemen.
6
 
Although the So San case is considered the catalyst for the creation of the 
PSI, the PSI is not the basis for new legal grounds for interdiction, search or seizure. 
If the So San interdiction occurred today, and assuming the vessel were flying the 
Cambodian flag, the grounds for boarding, searching and seizing the cargo would not 
derive from the PSI. The UN Security Council Resolution 1718 and Resolution 1874 
were adopted in 2006 and in 2009 respectively, which mentioned that “All Member 
States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, 
through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, 
and whether or not originating in their territories…”7 and “all Member States to 
inspect vessels, with the consent of the flag State, on the high seas, if they have 
information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels 
contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited”.8 In fact, 
prior to the adoption by both Resolutions, which imposed sanctions on North Korea, 
the international legal basis for such actions did not exist. Even after their adoption, 
the legal grounds for boarding, searching and seizing the cargo would only exist if 
Cambodia had effectively incorporated the resolutions into Cambodian law. 
If the resolutions had been incorporated, and if the interdiction of the So San 
were attempted today, it would probably begin with the Spanish Navy seeking and 
receiving permission from Cambodia to board and search the vessel. The Spanish 
Navy could then seize the cargo if there were reasonable grounds that it contravened 
                                           
6 Goodman, A., Starr, B., King, J., Koppel, A., & Buckley, F. (2002). U.S. lets Scud ship sail to Yemen. 
Madrid: CNN, <http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/12/11/us.missile.ship/index.html>. 
7 UN Security Council Resolution 1718, 14 Oct. 2006, para. 8(a). 
8 UN Security Council Resolution 1874, 12 June 2009, para. 12. 
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Cambodian law. 
The So San case is therefore indicative of the key challenge addressed by the 
PSI: the limitations or ‘deficiencies in the existing legal structures’.9 Although the 
PSI does not overcome these limitations, they were recognized and the SIP contains 
an explicit commitment to work together to strengthen national and international law 
in this area.
10
 
 
 
2.3 Development 
The PSI’s structure and the nature of participation have evolved significantly 
since its inception in 2003. Initially, eleven “like-minded States”—Australia, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom 
and the USA—formed what was called the “core group”, which drafted the SIP and 
agreed to cooperate with the USA to develop the initiative.  
In 2004, the core group expanded to include Canada, Norway, Russia and 
Singapore, reflecting the desire to enlarge the geographic scope of the group and 
incorporate States that would be able to make positive contributions. Participants 
inquired into key steps needed for the PSI’s expanding and novel role like identifying 
national contact information and processes elaborated on achieving the main aim of 
the PSI. 
In parallel with this increased participation, the PSI evolved as the 
challenges, threats and practicalities of interdiction became better understood. By the 
first anniversary, it has been considerably pushed forward; “Common principles were 
defined and interdiction capabilities, consistent with international law and national 
regulations, have been developed”.11 
                                           
9 Klein, N. (2011). Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
10 Statement of Interdiction Principles (appendix A), para. 3. 
11 1st anniversary PSI meeting. (2004). Cracow: Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  
<http://www.psi.msz.gov.pl/resource/8e86df63-bde1-4bea-a778-ac6d777dbde9:JCR>. 
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The core group disbanded in 2005, as the basic principles of interaction had 
been established, and formed what is now called the Operational Experts Group 
(OEG).
12
 A chapter of expert gatherings were additionally held all the year round. 
In 2006, the PSI participants paid attention to the significance of developing 
its regional proportion as well as maintaining its functional focus and essentiality. 
They discussed, in addition, the activities of many participating countries to break up 
the financial means which upheld proliferators. It was concluded that all participants 
had to consider how their own administrations and domestic laws would be operated 
or strengthened in order to chase, identify, and tighten the trades of WMD traders and 
their confederates. Moreover, the PSI-endorsing States upheld to look into the way 
they could work in cooperation with each other for the purpose of disrupting 
proliferation funds and promoting their liabilities under United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1540 and 1673. 
The type and tempo of PSI activities was established quickly: meetings, 
workshops, exercises and outreach. The focus of activity during the first few years 
was twofold: to explore the PSI’s scope and test its capabilities; and to increase the 
number of States willing to support the PSI by publicly endorsing the SIP. In 2007, 
the OEG convened a meeting in Greece. In the same year, “seven States participated 
in “Pacific Shield ’07” hosted by Japan. The nations participating in the exercise 
were Australia, France, Britain, New Zealand, Japan, Singapore, and the United 
States … Senior officials from more than forty countries, including India and Oman, 
were also on hand to observe the exercises”.13 Allegedly owing to concerns of 
setting against North Korea, China and South Korea withheld from joining the 
exercise. The objective of the exercise was to loosen up a practical interdiction of a 
vessel under suspicion of carrying WMD. 
                                           
12 Valencia, M. J. (2006). The Proliferation Security Initiative: Making Waves in Asia. London: 
Routledge. 
13  Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). (2013, February 22). Inventory of International 
Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, p. 4. 
8 
 
More recently, in a 2009 cornerstone speech outlining his nuclear policy, US 
President Barack Obama declared: 
 
We must also build on our efforts to break up black markets, detect and 
intercept materials in transit, and use financial tools to disrupt this 
dangerous trade. Because this threat will be lasting, we should come 
together to turn efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative . . . into 
durable international institutions.
14
 
 
The extent to which the PSI has become a more durable international 
institution since 2009 is not clear. In other words, it is unclear how his declaration 
has changed the PSI or whether the PSI has become a more “durable international 
institution” as a consequence. 
At Abu Dhabi in 2010, U.S. set forth exercise “Leading Edge” which was 
the international training including thirty countries, three of which joined as 
observers. At the opening of the training, U.S. Ambassador Richard Olson stated that 
“there have been over thirty exercises of this type that send a message to proliferators 
that there is a global network of nations committed to stopping proliferation of 
WMD”.15 The objective of this exercise was to give countries a chance to pursue 
vital basics of the operation for interdicting WMD. The exercise enclosed three 
diverse phases: a feasible phase where the U.S. Coast Guard gave instruction to 
boarding squads, a functional phase which managed customs and legal enactment, 
and an argumentative phase which could be dealt by a strategic conference about 
customs and legal issues after interdiction.  
In 2011, “the government of Mongolia hosted a PSI bilateral conference with 
the United States in 2011. The conference consisted of a workshop and Table Top 
                                           
14 Remarks by President Barack Obama. Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2009, 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-
Delivered>. 
15 Remarks of Ambassador Richard Olson at US-UAE Proliferation Security Initiative Training. Abu 
Dhabi: Embassy of the United States, 2010, <http://abudhabi.usembassy.gov/pr_01252010.html>. 
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Exercise on how to better combat the spread of WMD”.16 Furthermore, in order to 
interdict WMD in Hawaii, PSI participants were supposed to set up Critical 
Capabilities and Practices (CCP) which was “a cooperative and voluntary effort offer 
support to all PSI-endorsing States in strengthening their critical interdiction 
capabilities and practices”.17 
In 2012, Poland hosted a regional PSI CCP workshop which was 
contemplated identifying concrete expedients and tools that could be functional and 
helpful in conducting and developing interdiction activities. Most recently, in 2013, 
“Leading Edge 13”, a multinational PSI exercise with OEG community and the other 
PSI professions, was co-hosted by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the U.S. As 
the core group or OEG expanded, so did the number of SIP-endorsing States that 
were not members. The result is a two-tier participation structure comprising 102 
States (see Table 2.1). 
 
 
2.4 Hybrid approach 
Supports to the political pledge of PSI are legally enforceable bilateral ship-boarding 
agreements between open-registry States and the United States which have 
unrestricted national maritime laws as comfortable nests for illegal actions; the 
Bahamas, Liberia, Panama, and other seven countries are included in the open-
registry States. The core group had considered if these bilateral agreements had to be 
made as parts of the PSI before the United States negotiated them. In the end, it 
decided that they had to be bilaterally arranged by the United States. Although the 
U.S. is the sole country which shall seize the ships with open registry, the American 
bilateral agreements can be asked for when necessary.  
                                           
16 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). (See note 13 above). 
17 PSI-Endorsing States Undertake Effort to Build Critical Capabilities and Practices (CCP) for 
Interdicting WMD. Washington, D.C.: The United States Department of State, 2011, 
<http://www.state.gov/t/isn/166732.htm>. 
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Table 2.1. States that have endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative Statement of 
Interdiction Principles as of April 2013 
 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Andorra 
Angola 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas, The 
Bahrain 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Belize 
Bosnia 
Brunei Darussalam 
Bulgaria 
Cambodia 
Canada 
Chile 
Colombia 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
El Salvador 
Estonia 
Fiji 
Finland 
France 
Georgia 
 
 
Germany 
Greece 
Holy See 
Honduras 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Korea, Republic of 
Kyrgyzstan 
Kuwait 
Latvia 
Liberia 
Libya 
Liechtenstein 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macedonia 
Malta 
Marshall Islands 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Morocco 
The Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Oman 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
 
 
Paraguay 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Qatar 
Romania 
Russia 
Samoa 
Saudi Arabia 
San Marino 
Serbia 
Singapore 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Tajikistan 
Thailand 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uzbekistan 
Vanuatu 
Yemen 
 
 
Sources: US Department of State, ‘Proliferation Security Initiative participants’, 27 Sep. 2012, 
<http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27732.htm>;  
US Department of State, ‘Thailand endorses the Proliferation Security Initiative’, 19 Nov. 2012, 
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/11/200849.htm>. 
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Rested on the PSI’s principles, these agreements were negotiated by the 
United States after it formed the PSI. The ship-boarding agreements are parallel with 
the PSI principles in terms of concept and vocabulary, but the wording delivers more 
precise points. Basically, “the bilateral agreements span an average of eleven pages, 
whereas the PSI’s principles account for one-and-a-half pages”.18 Shunning the 
potential destruction of evidence, the bilateral agreements provide contact points and 
procedures for urgent interdiction as well as help share information and settle 
disputes. The bilateral agreements also address a number of the sensitive details that 
the countries involved evade addressing particularly. 
Meanwhile, these binding agreements were intended to inhibit the countries 
involved from shipping WMD freight. They were massively publicized to gesture to 
proliferators that the PSI were well aware of the problem, and that the trafficking 
routes that the proliferators would reckon were not clear of interdiction. 
The United States drew on a hybrid regime by conjoining an overarching 
multiple pledge with legally enforceable bilateral agreements. Such a framework 
helped several countries begin to conform to the PSI and rise to the maritime security 
challenges. Soon, the United States determined the PSI’s principles through initiating 
the PSI with countries which had little interest in compliance. Then the United States 
went slow for negotiating legally enforceable agreements with countries which 
valued compliance but did not guarantee it after the basic agreement settled in. In 
other words, PSI’s presence played an important role in facilitating the formation of 
the bilateral agreements. 
 
 
2.5 Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
The Container Security Initiative (CSI) was initiated by the U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP) Agency in 2002. The CSI is to preliminarily screen 
                                           
18  Belcher, E. (2011). The Proliferation Security Initiative(Lessons for Using Nonbinding 
Agreements). New York: The Council on Foreign Relations. 
12 
 
cargo, which is made for the U.S., before that cargo arrives at U.S. ports or crosses 
borders. The CSI first focused on the leading twenty ports which dispatched vessels 
to the United States, like Bremerhaven, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Today, “CBP’s 
58 operational CSI ports now prescreen over 80 percent of all maritime containerized 
cargo imported into the United States”.19 
When the cargo arrives in the United States, it is surely filtered again. 
However, many crooked starts and misapprehensions may be unraveled before the 
cargo departs from its port of disembarkation through a preliminary screening 
overseas. Once the cargo gets to the United States, such a screening even speeds the 
stream of commerce. 
The CSI is reciprocal with the PSI; the aim of both initiatives is to enhance 
international maritime security through an improvement in the ability to interdict or 
preclude shipments of WMD freight. On the other hand, it should be noted that there 
is a difference between the two initiatives. Whereas the CSI concentrates on 
maritime cargo toward the United States, the PSI manages cargo in transit, on ocean, 
on land, and in the air worldwide. Furthermore, PSI efforts entail proceeding against 
shipments not only when they get to a port but also over their transportation life. 
At ports abroad, the CSI has efficiently used and is elaborating cargo 
screening strategies, including radiation detection technique and x-ray machines. 
What is more, it collects database information on the chronicle and performance of 
freighters all over the world. Significantly, PSI efforts would be easily connected to 
CSI stewardship.  
                                           
19 CSI In Brief. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2011. 
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CHAPTER 3. Operation of the PSI 
 
Nowadays, nearly half the entire member States of the United Nations 
pertain to the PSI confederates all over the world. Nevertheless, the participants’ 
active dedication is essential for operating the PSI. In order to establish the 
foundations of the PSI activities, the supporting countries are recommended to 
consider several practical means such as interdictions, exercises, signing boarding 
agreements, and attending Operational Experts Group (OEG) meetings. 
 
 
3.1 Interdictions 
At least in politics, actual interdictions possibly provide the most important 
standard of PSI’s impact. A successful interdiction, for instance, “occurred in 
February 2007, when four nations worked together to interdict equipment bound for 
Syria—equipment that could have been used to test ballistic missile components”.20 
To be specific, there were four parties from four different States involved: the 
producer of the equipment, the intercessor, the shipping company, and customs 
officials who unload and examined the equipment. Such interdictions “have been 
successful all over the world and have stopped many shipments of sensitive materials 
destined for Iran, North Korea, and Syria”.21 
 
3.1.1 Interdiction based on SIP 
PSI participants notice the risks of proliferation and formulate in the SIP’s 
                                           
20 Remarks by National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley at the Proliferation Security Initiative 
Fifth Anniversary Senior Level Meeting. Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2008,  
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/05/20080528-3.html>. 
21 Ibid. 
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preface that they are “committed to working together to stop the flow of these items 
to and from States and non-State actors of proliferation concern.”22 Based on the 
purposes of the SIP, participants are certainly allowed to determine whether 
circumstances qualify in consideration of the recipient or the sender as a player of 
“proliferation concern” at the moment of an interdiction.  
Furthermore, some vocabularies in the SIP lead to politic opacity. But a few 
nations such as the U.S. have made less secret of listing countries which are deemed 
as “proliferation concern” nowadays. During a U.S. State Department press briefing 
in October 2004, John Bolton, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security, read a Libyan statement saying that “Libya has agreed to end 
all military trade with countries considered to be of serious ‘proliferation concern’—
specifically Iran, North Korea and Syria”.23 
In addition, the statement in the SIP reflects flexibility for the sequence with 
time. Some ten years ago, for instance, most analysts might probably have deemed 
Libya to be one of the target countries of the PSI; but it is no longer regarded in the 
same way. 
It is inferred from another vital passage of the SIP that the PSI-endorsing 
countries would operate in order to hinder and cut off WMD trades “consistent with 
national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including 
the U.N. Security Council.” 24  This passage permits “only a very brief and 
rudimentary breakdown of the legality of actions contemplated by the PSI”.25 The 
most general concern was that, without the flag State’ warrant, PSI interdictions 
could be conducted particularly on the high seas with licit justification derived from 
vague claims of self-defense. Significantly, the PSI was discerned to operate within 
                                           
22 Statement of Interdiction Principles (appendix A), preface (para. 1). 
23 Bolton, J. R. (2004). Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, Stopping the 
Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asian-Pacific Region: The Role of the Proliferation 
Security Initiative. Washington, D.C.: The United States Department of State. 
24 Statement of Interdiction Principles (appendix A), para. 2. 
25 Joyner, D. H. (2004, January 12). The PSI and International Law. The Monitor, pp. 7-9. 
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existent legal frames even if exposition of international law quite varied. It seemed, 
moreover, that the PSI would highly rely on domestic legal authorities like 
conducting hunts either at ports or on the territorial waters and seizing cargo based 
on national export laws. In addition, PSI participants were devoted to “review and 
work to strengthen ... national legal authorities ... and to strengthen ... relevant 
international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to support these 
commitments.”26 
Last but not least, the duty mentioned in the SIP recites possible strategies in 
which PSI-endorsing nations could advocate interdiction attempts like blocking, 
embarking, and examining through ships in their ports or territorial waters. As a 
matter of fact, participants immediately started the first multinational exercise under 
the auspices of the PSI only three weeks later the principles were proclaimed. 
 
3.1.2 Measuring impact of interdiction 
For at least four different reasons, the issue of measuring impact of 
interdiction is controversial and unconvinced. Firstly, PSI-endorsing States hardly 
make any public comments on successes in interdiction operations, and even worse, 
they never convey their failures. A majority of member States are hesitant about 
publicizing their intelligence shortcomings and military capabilities. At least, some 
of them dislike resulting in political dispute in their domestic realms by participating 
in the initiative.  
To be specific, incomplete and irregular information on interdictions only 
has been publicized. At a press center briefing in May 2008, John Rood, Acting 
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs of the 
United States of America, not only argued typically about insufficient official data 
but also described PSI interdictions vaguely: “We literally had dozens of successful 
interdictions of items and technologies bound for countries of concern. We 
                                           
26 Statement of Interdiction Principles (appendix A), para. 3. 
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necessarily keep most of these successes confidential. We’re sharing intelligence 
information among parties. In some cases, it’s easier for countries to take action if 
the results will not be publicized.”27 
Secondly, it is doubtful about definite components of an interdiction. In May 
2011, for instance, the M/V (Motor Vessel) Light was being tracked by a U.S. naval 
vessel; the North Korean M/V Light was a ship which was flagged in Belize and 
carried a suspicious freight heading to Burma. According to American officials, 
“Belize was a member of the PSI, and the authorities in Belize gave permission to 
the United States to inspect the ship”.28 But the North Koreans refused to being 
boarded, and then ultimately, chose to return to homeland instead of being caught up.  
A few observers determine that such a case does not pertain to an 
interdiction because boarding or military face-off did not occur. Still, it fits a generic 
lexical depiction of “interdiction” which is similar to “deterrence”29 because the 
suspicious freight practically was not able to reach Burma. 
Thirdly, the distinctive challenge is that, in fact, it is hopeless to validate 
what would have been up in the air in terms of a novel discipline such as the PSI. As 
the So San case demonstrated,
30
 in an endeavor to shut off the delivery of WMD or 
associated carriage sources, a lot of PSI-endorsing States collaborated on the PSI by 
joining in interdiction activities. The argument is whether the PSI empowered some 
that might have been workable owing to it, or facilitated such proceedings after its 
coinage. 
Significantly, the interdiction of the BBC China is maybe the most  
                                           
27 Proliferation Security Initiative: John Rood, Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security. (2008). Foreign Press Center Roundtable Briefing. Washington, D.C.: The 
United States Department of State, <http://2002-2009-fpc.state.gov/105206.htm>. 
28 Sanger, D. E. (2011, June 12). U.S. Said to Turn Back North Korea Missile Shipment. The New 
York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/world/asia/13missile.html>. 
29 “Interdiction,” Webster’s Online Dictionary,  
<http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org/definitions/interdiction>. The point is reinforced by the 
extended definition given by the same source: “The purpose of interdiction is to delay, disrupt, or 
destroy enemy forces or supplies en route to the battle area.” 
30 Goodman, A., Starr, B., King, J., Koppel, A., & Buckley, F. (See note 6 above). 
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recognized case which exemplifies the PSI’s complexity. The need for multinational 
cooperation was demonstrated by the interdiction of a delivery of uranium 
enrichment centrifuge from Malaysia to Libya in October 2003. The Malaysian-
produced equipment was transported on a German-owned ship, the BBC China, 
leaving Dubai, passing through the Suez Canal.
31
 Allegedly, the German shipping 
company was requested by the U.S. to redirect the vessel to the place where it was 
probed, the Italian port of Taranto. Authorities might have been provided with an 
opportunity to hold off a vessel and found a basis to board it while it was passing 
through the Suez Canal under an enormous oversight. 
The BBC China instance is credited as a great achievement of the PSI by the 
PSI advocators. On the other hand, critics’ criticism is that it was not a PSI 
interdiction but an interdiction which took place involving four States involved in the 
PSI. Department of State spokesperson Richard Boucher stated that “[t]here were 
other efforts being pursued than the PSI … finding out and stopping this shipment. 
So in that case, we did not want to say it was solely a matter of the PSI because [it] 
was, if I remember, at an early stage back then.”32 
Lastly, proliferation interdictions or thriving action to prevent shipments at 
the beginning shall be tough to duplicate. Advocators of the PSI run down to make 
over exercises for enhancing their chances of success. On the whole, the PSI has to 
continually adapt to block new proliferation approaches. Taking advantage of the 
CCP initiative might be one of the means to do so, if it secures its intention to 
develop the ability to prevent the widespread proliferation concern. 
 
 
 
                                           
31 Nikitin, M. B. (2012). Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service. 
32 Boese, W. (2005). Key U.S. Interdiction Initiative Claim Misrepresented. Arms Control Today. 
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3.2 Exercises 
Particularly, depression in PSI activity has been noticeable in the exercise 
domain until recently. There have been more or less fifty PSI exercises since 2003, 
including application of PSI scenarios in conventional regional exercises, command 
post exercises, and dedicated live exercises. While several have dealt with 
interdictions in the air, on the ground, and at ports, most have concentrated on 
maritime capabilities.  
The number of PSI exercises had lowered considerably until 2011 (see Table 
3.1). The first major cause for the significant decrease until 2011 must be “initiative 
fatigue” resulting from fading initial passion. The second cause must be budget 
harshness, particularly in consideration of global economic complexities and the fact 
that a low number of participants gave up to PSI spending. The final one must be the 
lack of incentives to exploits. 
Meanwhile, it was never believed that the increase in 2012 represented the 
start of a new upward tendency. Rather, it was forecasted that the number of 
exercises would persist to remain volatile. The exercises in 2012 reflected at least 
one adoption to nonstop budget stringencies: planting PSI scripts in more anticipated, 
overall, and perceptional exercises.  
The multinational exercises validate the two tactics that the PSI handles in 
contending with proliferation: control and restraint. The tactic of control involves 
difficult jobs of making interdictions functional in terms of laws, operations, and 
policies. The control consists of diverse efforts, including enhancing intelligence 
communion, looking into variable legitimate regimes applicable to reinforce seizure, 
and running over actual interdictions and detainers. When it comes to the tactic of 
restraint, even if hardened proliferators like North Korea don’t seem to be restrained 
by exercises or interdictions, mediators and less-hardened proliferators shall be. 
Compatible demonstration of escalated accord and capability may, at least, induce 
participants in proliferation communities to increase the costs of transactions. 
In June 2011, OEG partners formalized a U.S. proposal to take over a CCP  
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Table 3.1. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Exercises 
2013 Exercise LEADING EDGE 2013 (Abu Dhabi, UAE) 
2012 
Exercise EASTERN ENDEAVOR 2012 (Busan, Korea) 
Exercise PANAMAX 2012 (Panama, Miami) 
PACIFIC SHIELD 2012 (Sapporo, Japan) 
Exercise PHOENIX EXPRESS 2012 (Mediterranean Sea) 
Exercise SAHARAN EXPRESS 2012 (Western Africa) 
2010 
Exercise EASTERN ENDEAVOR (Busan, Korea) 
Exercise PACIFIC PROTECTOR 10 (Cairns, Australia) 
Exercise PHOENIX EXPRESS 10 (Mediterranean Sea) 
Exercise LEADING EDGE (UAE) 
2009 
Exercise DEEP SABRE II (Singapore) 
Exercise PANAMAX 09 (Panama, Miami) 
Exercise PHOENIX EXPRESS 09 (Mediterranean Sea) 
2008 
Exercise MARU 07 (Auckland, NZ) 
Exercise PANAMAX 08 (Panama & Miami) 
Exercise ADRIATIC SHIELD 08 (Croatia) 
Exercise PHOENIX EXPRESS 08 (Mediterranean Sea) 
Exercise GUISTIR 08 (Djibouti) 
2007 
Exercise EASTERN SHIELD 07 (Ukraine) 
Exercise PACIFIC SHIELD 07 (Japan) 
Exercise PANAMAX 07 (Panama, Miami) 
PSI Gaming Exercise (Newport, U.S.) 
Exercise ADRIATIC GATE (Slovenia) 
Exercise SMART RAVEN (Lithuania) 
2006 
Exercise LEADING EDGE (Persian Gulf) 
Exercise AMBER SUNRISE (Poland) 
Exercise HADES '06 (France) 
Exercise PACIFIC PROTECTOR '06 (Australia) 
Exercise ANATOLIAN SUN (Turkey) 
Exercise PACIFIC PROTECTOR 06 (Australia) 
Exercise TOP PORT (Netherlands) 
2005 
Exercise EXPLORING THEMIS (UK) 
PSI Air Gaming Exercise (Bergen, Norway) 
Exercise DEEP SABRE (Singapore) 
Exercise BLUE ACTION 05 (Spain) 
Exercise BOHEMIAN GUARD 05 (Czech Republic) 
Exercise NINFA 05 (Portugal) 
2004 
Exercise CHOKEPOINT 04 (U.S.) 
Exercise TEAM SAMURAI 04 (Japan) 
PSI Gaming Exercise (Newport, U.S.) 
Exercise APSE '04 (France) 
Exercise SAFE BORDERS (Wroclaw, Poland) 
Exercise CLEVER SENTINEL (Mediterranean) 
Exercise HAWKEYE Frankfurt, Germany) 
Exercise AIR BRAKE 03 (Trapani, Italy) 
Exercise SEA SABER (Arabian Sea) 
2003 
Exercise BASILIC 03 (Western Mediterranean) 
Exercise SANSO 03 (Western Mediterranean) 
Exercise PACIFIC PROTECTOR (Coral Sea) 
 
Source: US Department of State, ‘Calendar of Events’, <www.state.gov/t/isn/c27700.htm>. 
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initiative which is another, maybe less pricy, mean to help raise PSI interdiction 
capabilities. If the CCP promise is materialized, it would enhance interdiction 
capabilities of PSI partisans as well as revive their hub on the practical purposes of 
PSI. Allegedly, four areas mapped out for the CCP evaluate interdiction-related 
requirements in all directions: identification and inspection, rapid decision-making, 
and legal frameworks. 
 
 
3.3 Boarding agreements 
In October 2003, the United States and PSI partners “had an initial exchange 
of views on a possible boarding agreement which could facilitate practical 
implementation of the initiative”.33 Eleven foremost flag States such as the Bahamas, 
Cyprus, and Marshall Islands have signed the agreements. Schemes to embark and 
examine vessels on suspicion of delivering WMD materials are listed on those 
agreements. For instance, the agreements even call for an official and prompt 
response to an inquiry from the other State to board the suspicious ship no longer 
than two hours. Especially, the agreements may be influential from that point 
because all the countries with whom the U.S. has filled boarding agreements are not 
OEG’s members.  
Meanwhile, the mutual and legally binding agreement indicates that 
permission to board and search ships tend to be granted, although the mutual 
agreements do not insure that the flag State would collaborate with when it is asked. 
The U.S. Department of State recites that the ship-boarding agreements signed so far: 
 
provide authority on a bilateral basis to board sea vessels suspected of 
carrying out illicit shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their 
delivery systems, or related materials. These agreements will facilitate 
                                           
33  Proliferation Security Initiative: Chairman's Conclusions at the Fourth Meeting. (2003). 
Washington, D.C.: The United States Department of State. 
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bilateral cooperation to prevent such shipments by establishing procedures 
to board and search such vessels in international waters. Under the 
agreements, if a vessel registered in the U.S. or the partner country is 
suspected of carrying proliferation-related cargo, either one of the Parties 
to this agreement can request of the other to confirm the nationality of the 
ship in question and, if needed, authorize the boarding, search, and 
possible detention of the vessel and its cargo. These agreements are 
important steps in further operationalizing the Proliferation Security 
Initiative and strengthening the mechanisms that we have at our disposal to 
interdict suspect weapons of mass destruction-related cargoes. They are 
modeled after similar arrangements that exist in the counter-narcotics 
arena.
34
 
 
 
3.4 Operational Experts Group (OEG) 
Most planning for the initiative takes place during meetings of the PSI 
Operational Experts Group (OEG). As of early 2013, primarily from Europe and 
North America, the OEG comprises twenty-one States of the eighty States that have 
signed up to the principles of PSI.
35
 The purpose of OEG is to develop policies, 
arrange the schedules of PSI exercise in various arenas all over the world, and 
provide a conference to share expertise and intelligence.  
Generally, the OEG meets on a quarterly basis in varied locations globally. 
Deliberation at these gatherings carries a scope of subjects including exercise 
procedures and practical morals. The meetings are crucial to PSI considering that 
they offer a forum for interchanging information which is in regard to the 
consequence and effectiveness of the diverse PSI exercises operated across the world. 
                                           
34 Ship Boarding Agreements. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State, 2013,  
<http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27733.htm>. 
35 Williams, I. (2013). U.S., Allies to Strengthen WMD Initiative. Arms Control Today. 
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OEG’s framework and practice make the gatherings extraordinary in many 
points because the OEG does not have a secretariat, formal presidency, and an 
institutional mechanism. The role of supervising the meetings is normally played by 
the hosting State.   
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CHAPTER 4. Challenges of the PSI 
 
Although the PSI is one of innovative and various means as a non-
proliferation tool, in the meantime, it also faces legal, political, and structural 
challenges. Those challenges are related to the operational function of the PSI as well 
as its perceived lawfulness. It may seem doubtful whether the ongoing PSI can be 
convincing in precluding proliferation. In order to lessen such a concern, PSI 
participants need to try more to raise the capacity of the PSI, taking into account the 
primary challenges of it. 
 
 
4.1 Legal challenges  
 
4.1.1 Criminal jurisdiction in maritime zones 
The U.S. and Turkey are only two countries which have not agreed and 
endorsed United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982
36
 
among 102 PSI participants. The stipulations held in the UNCLOS are extremely a 
collection of the customary international law concerning the law of the sea. Many of 
nations signed on the UNCLOS and “it had become part of customary international 
law even before its formal ratification”.37 Although the United States is not a party 
to the UNCLOS, it has declared that customary law has included a majority of 
contents of the UNCLOS when it comes to coastal State jurisdiction of territorial sea, 
continental shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and the rules regarding 
navigation and flight over straits and territorial sea. 
                                           
36 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (hereinafter UNCLOS). 
37 Anand, R. P. (2004). Studies in International Law and History: An Asian Perspective. Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
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In those diverse maritime areas, the criminal and civil jurisdiction of external 
ships can be skeptical for being applied to the PSI because each country holds 
criminal and civil jurisdiction over vessels which belong to its own State. If an 
interdiction is performed by the flag State of the objective vessel, the interdiction is 
considered legal. Therefore, most expected PSI operations on international waters 
tend to be illegal, because they are supposed to be taken up by other countries rather 
than the vessel’s flag State. The United States, at the Operational Meeting of the PSI 
in 2003, brought out that “…we can find a variety of ways to interdict illegal 
shipments when the vessels carrying them come to port, given that sovereign power 
is at its greatest in national waters”.38 
Based on the SIP, it is considered that “the PSI States will search and 
interdict vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying WMD material while they 
are in transit through their internal waters, territorial sea or contiguous zone, thereby 
conferring national jurisdiction to PSI States for enforcement purposes”. 39  It 
demonstrates that the expression “national waters” from the PSI participants can 
combine the respective maritime areas. The “national waters”, however, actually 
compose the below respective categories of legal jurisdiction with the purpose of 
interdiction of ships which are under suspicion of transporting WMD materials. 
 
i. Internal waters 
Internal waters enable nations to enjoy utmost criminal jurisdiction over 
vessels delivering unlawful WMD or related carriage sources. The nations freely 
board and probe into those ships which are staying in the port area because part of 
internal waters of the coastal States are made up by the port. In addition, if the 
                                           
38 Bolton, J. R. (2003). "Legitimacy" in International Affairs: The American Perspective in Theory 
and Operation. Washington, D.C.: The United States Department of State,  
<http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/us/rm/26143.htm>. 
39 Thomas, T. V. (2009). The Proliferation Security Initiative: Towards Relegation of Navigational 
Freedoms in UNCLOS? Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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delivery of the problematic goods is illegal under the national laws, the States can 
take over the cargo moved into the internal waters.  
The Ku Wol San incident shows a case of such a seizure in internal waters. In 
June 1999, a cargo ship M/V Ku Wol San coming from North Korea casted anchor in 
the Kandla port in India and then it was allowed to unload its sugar. At the Kandla 
port, a few customs officials embarked the ship in order to check its North Korean 
cargo vessel M/V Ku Wol San, coming from Namp'o which is 50 km southwest of 
Pyongyang. Then it sought permission to unload its sugar. At the Kandla port, a small 
contingent of customs officials boarded the vessel to check its shipping invoice. They 
were confident that the vessel contained mountains of equipment in relation to a 
pneumatic press, hardware, missiles, and even toroidal air bottles employable for 
guiding missiles. It was the first and the largest interdiction by any country of such a 
vast quantity of missile parts.
40
  
Not only was the WMD-related cargo sequestered, but also were master and 
chief of the vessel seized and put in ward. And then they were released after more or 
less three months without any charges brought against them. Despite the 
consequence of the occasion, it is meaningful to notice that, North Korea was the 
only State which took issue with the handling of the occasion by Indian authorities; 
the rest of States regarded that the methodology was indeed admissible by 
international law. 
 
ii. Territorial waters 
“Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, 
good order or security of the coastal State if [it navigates] in the territorial sea”41 
under Article 19 of the UNCLOS. The delivery of WMD, their shipment networks, 
and associated substances are not particularly encompassed by the PSI’s potential 
items of interdiction targets, even though the UNCLOS specifies that a passage can 
                                           
40 Sudarshan, V. (2006, October 23). This Ship Is Loaded. Outlook India. 
41 UNCLOS (See note 36 above), art. 19. 
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be condemned in case of certain affairs. Uniform clarification of regulations of 
international law controlling innocent passage is provided by the United States 
mentioning that the right of innocent passage shall be utilized regardless of the ship’s 
freight and, thus, the inventory in Article 19 makes logical sense.  
The UNCLOS states that “the coastal State shall notify a diplomatic agent or 
consular officer of the flag State before taking any steps, and shall facilitate contact 
between such agent or officer and the ship's crew.”42 Criminal jurisdiction over 
foreign ships, accordingly, is not supposed to be exercised by coastal States 
excluding under concrete cases specified in Article 27(1).
43
 To be specific, the 
UNCLOS says that “the criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should not be 
exercised on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea” except for the 
cases below:
44
 
 
(a) if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State; 
(b) if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good 
order of the territorial sea; 
(c) if the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the master 
of the ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State; 
or 
(d) if such measures are necessary for the suppression of illegal traffic in 
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. 
 
The overall rule for criminal jurisdiction of coastal States, therefore, is not 
meant to oppose the illicit dealing of WMD substances, even if illicit dealing of 
psychotropic and sedative materials is definitely cited. The supreme rule is that “a 
foreign ship passing through the territorial sea is not under the criminal jurisdiction 
                                           
42 UNCLOS (See note 38 above), art. 27(3). 
43 UNCLOS (See note 38 above), art. 27(1). 
44 UNCLOS (See note 38 above), art. 27(1)(a)–(d). 
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of the coastal state … There is uncertainty as to whether this principal rule is one of 
comity or of law”.45  
Ivan Shearer, Emeritus Professor of Law at the University of Sydney, has 
indicated that “the drafting history of Article 27 of the UNCLOS shows that the 
hortatory words ‘should not’ were deliberately chosen over the proposed words ‘may 
not’ in order to preserve the plenary jurisdiction of a coastal State over its territorial 
waters”.46 Thus, PSI participants shall outlaw transportation of WMD and constitute 
rigorous regulations over exportation corresponding to transnational criterion by 
force of their integral jurisdiction. They might eventually be encouraged to justify a 
sea power for interdiction over foreign ships concerning the supposition that, in 
territorial waters, coastal States enjoy boundless criminal jurisdiction. 
Based on the SIP 4(d), nevertheless, strongly prompts the PSI participants to 
work properly to “stop and/or search in their internal waters, territorial seas, or 
contiguous zones vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or 
from States or non-State actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that 
are identified”.47 Hence, three diverse maritime zones with comparably diverse legal 
regimes are tied together by this provision. It enlarges the geographical breadth of the 
PSI actions unlawfully and unreasonably. The SIP is consequently in conflict with 
not only the limits on governance of a coastal State in the contiguous zone but also 
the legitimate regime controlling “innocent passage” in the territorial sea. 
 
iii. Contiguous zone 
The strait nearby the territorial waters, according to the UNCLOS, is 
considered the contiguous zone, “which may not extend beyond twenty-four nautical  
                                           
45 Persbo, A., & Davis, I. (2004). Sailing Into Uncharted Waters? Washington, D.C.: British 
American Security Information Council, <http://www.basicint.org/publications/andreas-
persbo/2004/sailing-uncharted-waters-proliferation-security-initiative-and-law->. 
46 Thomas, T. V. (See note 39 above). 
47 See Appendix A for the full text of SIP. 
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miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured”.48 
Basically, the jurisdiction of the coastal State largely declines in such a contiguous 
zone. The State must have constituted laws on a violation of its customs laws in 
terms of an unauthorized cargo, so that it can interdict a vessel delivering WMD 
constituent in this zone.  
The cargo, furthermore, should be derived from the mainland going towards 
international waters or needs to be going towards the mainland. For instance, the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ruled in the MV Saiga case that “the 
coastal State may presume that their removal from the contiguous zone without its 
approval would result in an infringement within its territory or territorial sea of the 
laws”.49 There is naturally no authorization to control the ships navigating within the 
contiguous zone. 
 
iv. Exclusive economic zone 
Based on the UNCLOS, “the exclusive economic zone shall not extend 
beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured”.50 The EEZ is fundamentally aimed to keep the economic 
advantages that a State can acquire from its bordering seas; specifically those 
involved in fishing and discovering minerals. In terms of confiscation of WMD and 
associated substances, “the EEZ can be regarded as international waters. Only with 
great difficulty could a State argue that an interdiction of a ship carrying WMD is 
necessary to protect and preserve the marine environment”.51 
 
                                           
48 UNCLOS (See note 36 above), art. 33(2). 
49 The M/V “Saiga” (No. 2) Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea). (1999). Judgment. 
Hamburg: International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. 
50 UNCLOS (See note 36 above), art. 57. 
51 Persbo, A., & Davis, I. (See note 45 above). 
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v. International waters 
All oceans excluding the areas which belong to a certain State’s internal 
waters, territorial waters, contiguous zones, and EEZ can be considered either 
international waters or high seas. The coastal State’s discretion to apply its 
regulations in the high seas is severely restricted by the law of the sea. According to 
the UNCLOS, “ships shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas”.52 
The legal ground for interdicting vessels in the international waters is 
harshly held down and allowable simply in several instances. Therefore, in the 
context of the PSI, if a State esteems that WMD trafficking has a high probability of 
affecting its own water and the alleged descent is being carried out on a nonnative 
vessel in international waters, the country concerned is incompetent to block and 
condemn the WMD traders as long as the vessel hangs around the high seas.  
The So San episode illustrates that interdiction of shipments is now and then 
functional in international waters. The major question of admissible siege from the 
embarked ship was raised by this incident which shows that the United States and 
other Western sea forces, in practice, may use the permissible seizure to break 
“legitimate” delivery by embarking ships such as the So San.  
Two central principles of the UNCLOS, freedom of navigation and right of 
innocent passage, would be challenged by any act which impacts on legitimate 
shipping. These leading principles of the UNCLOS have gained the level of 
customary law. Consequently, the operative rules of the PSI should be necessarily put 
to the test on the criterion of the essential philosophy of international maritime law.  
 
4.1.2 Right of innocent passage 
Based on the fact that headway of a shipment of WMD or kindred material is 
not likely to be an innocent passage, the right of innocent passage ensured by the 
UNCLOS is often held down by the PSI. In addition, the PSI is against one of the 
                                           
52 UNCLOS (See note 36 above), art. 92. 
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purposes of UN envisaged in the UN Charter—“To develop friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples…”53 because it holds down the WMD delivery and kindred substances of 
the non-nuclear weapon countries by supporting nuclear weapon countries. The 
relations among alliances worldwide may get affected because the PSI agitates “the 
principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among 
States”.54 
 
4.1.3 Freedom of navigation 
When it comes to the interdiction, the essential factor in the PSI is a menace 
to international law of the sea which guarantees freedom of navigation. In October 
1946, one of the Corfu Channel incidents occurred; four British Navy ships were 
heading north over the Corfu Channel with the specific orders to try out Albanian 
response to their freedom of navigation. One of the ships hit a mine and got battered 
while passing into what was deemed a zone without a mine nearby the Albanian 
coast, then another ship also hit a mine while towing the damaged ship. The 
International Court of Justice declared that Albanian had to pay for the loss of British 
Navy. The Corfu Channel episode is well precedented that “maritime navigational 
freedoms cannot be interfered with, even to serve the security concerns of other 
nations, and that compensation must be paid when injuries to persons and property 
occur”.55 
The freedom of navigation is confined by the UNCLOS in many ways such 
as negotiating mutual settlements. In addition, if WMD and related materials are 
                                           
53 Charter of the United Nations, opened for signature 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 Oct. 1945, 
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>. 
54 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Annex to GA Res 2625(XXV) (24 
October 1970). 
55 Thomas, T. V. (See note 39 above). 
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detected, countries could agree on specific actions which can be initiated by the 
interdicting country. Nevertheless, confiscation of cargo could be commonly allowed, 
only if the interdicting country and the flag State are at war. Another way is to call 
for the consent of either the government of the flag State or the master of the target 
ship itself. A successful illustration of such a method of operation is the case of BBC 
China.
56
 
 
4.1.4 UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 
The current UNSCRs do not give sufficient latitude to States to deviate from 
international law to interdict vessels of concern. There are four sets of UNSCR 
currently relevant to stopping the illegal transport of WMDs. UNSCR 1540 (2004) 
calls on all States “to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, 
chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials.”57 
However, UNSCR 1540 limits any measure used to those “consistent with 
international law.”  
The second set of UNSCR refers to Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. Of 
these, UNSCR 1803 (2008) is aimed at tightening restrictions on Iran’s nuclear 
activities, and calls on States to “inspect cargo to and from Iran … , provided 
‘reasonable grounds’ existed to believe that the aircraft or vessel was transporting 
prohibited goods.”58 However, such action is again limited within the ranges of 
international law.  
The third set of UNSCR focuses on North Korea’s nuclear program. Of these, 
UNSCR 1874 (2009) was enacted in response to North Korea’s 2009 nuclear test, 
                                           
56 Nikitin, M. B. (See note 31 above). 
57 Security Council Decides All States Shall Act to Prevent Proliferation of Mass Destruction 
Weapons. (2004). Press Release SC/8076. New York: United Nations, 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8076.doc.htm>. 
58  Security Council Tightens Restrictions on Iran’s Proliferation, Sensitive Nuclear Activities, 
Increases Vigilance Over Iranian Banks, Has States Inspect Cargo. (2008). Press Release SC/9268. 
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and called for the inspection of “all cargo to and from the DPRK” but also limits the 
inspections to that “consistent with international law.”59 Given that UNSCR 1874 
still maintains this restriction despite clear evidence of nuclear capability by North 
Korea, it seems the UN Security Council is unwilling to shut the proverbial barn door 
even after the horse has bolted.  
The fourth set of UNSCR tightens sanctions even further and introduced a 
number of new measures. Of particular relevance to the PSI are the provisions of 
Resolution 1929 that require all States: 
 
to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and 
consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and 
relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to and from Iran, 
in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has 
information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains 
items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited.
60
 
 
Generally, the ultimate target of Security Council sanction resolutions is to 
put a strain on a country or entity to obey the aims held by the Security Council 
without turning to the use of saber. The UN Charter makes it clear that member 
States of the UN “invite[s] members to participate in the decisions of the Security 
Council”.61 However, it is important to note that the State is only bound in Security 
Council resolutions; they claim national implementation so that they are binding on 
personnel or other legal entities. Countries are, hence, faced with delicate problems 
of domestic implementation, in general, adaptation of internal law. A small number 
of States at present merely have the necessary empowering legislation to obviously 
                                           
59 Security Council, Acting Unanimously, Condemns in Strongest Terms Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea Nuclear Test, Toughens Sanctions. (2009). Press Release SC/9679. New York: 
United Nations, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9679.doc.htm>. 
60 UN Security Council Resolution 1929, 9 June 2010,  
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comply with UN Security Council determinations. The implementation of the 
measures contained in Security Council resolutions, and the establishment of 
offences and their subsequent enforcement, is therefore dependent on adopting 
effective national laws. 
 
 
4.2 Political challenges  
 
4.2.1 Absent partners 
The PSI lacks the support of two primal countries in the PSI—China and 
Russia. Their non-participation creates holes in the WMD interdiction dragnet that 
can be exploited by a resolute trafficker and significantly limits the effectiveness of 
the PSI’s interdiction efforts.  
Firstly, even if China is a potentially significant country, it is a missing 
partner of the PSI. The Chinese foreign ministry spokesman has said that China “… 
can understand the worries by some countries over the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction ... [but it is also China’s view that] … some countries of the world 
have doubts over the legality and effectiveness of the measure. The best way to curb 
WMD proliferation is to safeguard and promote international security through 
consultations and dialogue”.62 And the US Administration and other PSI participants 
seem to have been eager to consult with China on the PSI issue in the near term.
63
 
Secondly, the other potentially significant country is Russia which is the 
only non-participant of PSI among the Group of Eight (G8) members. The Russian 
Federation has been skeptical regarding the legitimacy of PSI: “We have questions 
                                           
62 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Press Conference on September 4, 2003. Beijing: Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China, 
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/2510/2511/t25626.htm>. 
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about this initiative's compliance with international legal norms … [but in] general, 
the idea of intercepting vehicles shipping dangerous substances meets Russia's 
interests. We share the direction of this initiative”.64 
Yet, it is indefinite that what the Federation meant by saying “share the 
direction of the initiative”. It can be inferred that the Federation supports PSI’s 
practicality as well as shares its aim and objective. However, casting doubt on the 
initiative, Russia does not seem to be ready to sign up for it. 
Their participation in the PSI or endorsement of its principles would add 
significant clout and momentum to the initiative. It is undoubtedly considered, for 
instance, that Russia’s geopolitical locality, military forces, and perpetual 
membership in the UNSC could highly promote the PSI’s success. 
 
4.2.2 Sovereignty 
In the meantime, it is meaningful to recollect the shifted political context 
after the UN Conferences on the Law of the Sea. Particularly in Asia and the Middle 
East, critical and strategic straits were typically in the grasp of the maritime 
superpowers interested in claiming three miles of defined territorial sea and keeping 
them unrestricted before the Second World War. In addition to the crash of 
colonialism, there were emerging new countries which were interested in their own 
safeguard and moneymaking activities. But they were not enamored by the “freedom 
of the seas” doctrine which had been a vehicle to disadvantage them for a long time. 
Indeed, they wanted to curb it, feeling that unlimited freedom of the seas was against 
their interests.
65
 Many of the recently self-governing States are strait States which 
are currently capable of ruling the mighty waterways to keep their essential claims. 
There were other reasons for expanded jurisdictional claims by coastal States 
                                           
64 US lobbies Russia to join campaign against illicit arms shipments. (2004, January 29). SpaceWar 
Wire, <http://www.spacewar.com/2004/040129082721.dcagh536.html>. 
65 Anand, R. P. (1973, July). Tyranny of the Freedom of the Seas Doctrine. Interntional Studies, pp. 
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such as dumping on the high seas, the threat of oil spills, and other origins of water 
pollution. As more and more territorial waters were extended after 1960, most of 
these straits came to be included in the territorial seas subject to numerous controls 
and limitations occupied by the coastal States. 
Indeed, some of these States went further and sought to make certain that 
important straits include their absolute sovereignty. Thus, Indonesia and the 
Philippines, two newly-independent archipelagic States, sought to employ the 
method of straight baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands of 
the archipelagoes for delimitation of their extended territorial waters, thereby 
enclosing some of the most important straits.
66
 In particular, Indonesia holds a 
monopoly over all deep straits between the Asian continent and Australia which is 
linking up the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. The shutoff of those straits like Sunda, 
Lombok, Ombai-Wetar or Macassar would necessitate a diversion of traffic around 
Australia or through the Panama Canal resulting in higher consumer costs, time 
delays, and the reduced flexibility and maneuverability of naval forces. 
 
 
4.3 Structural challenges  
 
4.3.1 Distribution of bilateral agreements 
While the possibility of reaching bilateral agreements is obvious, again this 
would create co-ordination problems as well. If a single agreement or a model 
agreement could be reached and then agreements struck with States of registry, this 
would be one way of handling the problem. Given the concentration in the 
distribution of flags, only a few such agreements would be needed to have 
considerable effect. However, the problem of the remaining thirty percent of shipping 
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would remain. There would, inevitably, be some States that would refuse, and these 
hardest cases would have to be dealt with by some other means. 
Available public reports suggest that PSI members are at present still 
examining their various legal authorities. No public information discovered in the 
course of this research indicated either the precise nature of the boarding agreements 
being sought, or the nature of any difficulties in reaching it. One might anticipate, 
however, variations among States in their interpretation of their legal rights, and 
variances in their national legislation and regulations might be sources of difficulty. 
 
4.3.2 Transparency 
A lack of transparency appears to be an institutional characteristic of the PSI, 
and this is detrimental to international perception of the PSI’s impartiality. 
Intelligence is not shared equally among participants, nor is there any intent to make 
actionable intelligence available to all PSI States.
67
 The issue of transparency relates 
to two different PSI arenas of activity: organizational—the workings and activities 
associated with the OEG, ROEGs (Regional Operational Experts Groups), exercises, 
and workshops; and operational—the activities associated with a specific interdiction. 
At the organizational level there is actually a significant amount of 
information in the public domain. For OEG and ROEG meetings, the keynote speech 
and chairman’s statement are usually released by the host State.68 For exercises, 
press statements are usually issued that include the exercise scenarios and details of 
participants. Similarly, press statements and other information are released about 
workshops and capacity building. 
The basis for the criticism may therefore relate to accessibility, rather than 
the quantity or quality, of information available. The US Department of State’s PSI-
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Mass Destruction by Sea. Ontario: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. 
68 For a collection of the chairman’s statements from 2003 to 2006 and 2013 see US Department of 
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related web pages are the most comprehensive but do not contain, or link users to, 
material published after 2006—other than US-released press statements and fact 
sheets from 2009.
69
 A recent development that seeks to overcome this problem is the 
establishment in early 2013 of a public PSI website by the German Federal Foreign 
Office.
70
 The objective of the website is to inform the public about the PSI and it 
contains a wide range of information, publications, videos and links. 
At the operational level, transparency is closely linked to the problem of 
attribution. Additionally, it is not the PSI that undertakes interdictions, but the States 
that have chosen to participate in it. Equally, the extent to which these States 
consider the interdictions to be “PSI interdictions” is unclear and inconsistent. In the 
majority of cases, knowledge of an interdiction is restricted to the States that are 
directly involved and is not shared among OEG members. Other than high-profile 
cases where publicizing an interdiction is intended to prevent a proliferation attempt 
or deter proliferation more generally, it is unlikely that PSI interdictions will be 
publicized more widely. 
Even if the PSI is unable or unwilling to publicize interdictions, it could be 
more open about its internal workings, offer more clarity on the operational realities 
of the activities it promotes and make the information more accessible. The recent 
establishment of an official PSI website is a positive development, although the 
extent to which the OEG and its members are willing to be more open and actively 
contribute to the website is not yet clear.
71
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CHAPTER 5. The Coordination between the IMO and the PSI 
 
The PSI has its supreme merits of enhancing operational competence and 
technical skills to run interdiction operations. A critical demerit of the initiative, on 
the contrary, lies in the perception that it is an action dominated by United States. 
Accordingly, accepting or joining in the PSI is very hard for nonparticipating nations. 
In fact, the PSI’s operations are carried on through effective coordination among 
participating nations all around the world. At this point, it is necessary to examine the 
ways that the IMO can help achieve the PSI’s further development. 
 
 
5.1 Security-related IMO instruments 
One way to close legal gaps of the PSI and rectify many of its shortcomings 
would be to seek a security-related IMO instrument authorizing military action for 
interdiction generally or specifically. The security-related IMO instrument, together 
with legislative and treaty efforts against the trafficking of WMD and related 
material, could generate momentum towards an international norm or customary law 
aimed at halting WMD trafficking.  
 
5.1.1 SOLAS and ISPS Code 
Maritime security is essential as one of IMO's imperatives. A thorough 
mandatory security regulation for transnational shipment, the 1974 Safety of Life at 
Sea Convention (SOLAS)
72
, entered into force on 1 July 2004 and included several 
amendments to it. Among them, the one which had the most massive influence was 
                                           
72 The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974/1988 (hereinafter SOLAS). 
39 
 
the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code).
73
 The IMO 
states that “it contains detailed security-related requirements for Governments, port 
authorities and shipping companies in a mandatory section (Part A), together with a 
series of guidelines about how to meet these requirements in a second, non-
mandatory section (Part B)”.74 Under SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code, ship 
security plans must address measures contemplated preventing shipment of weapons, 
unwarranted goods, and dangerous materials for the use of application against human 
beings, ports or ships. 
So far, a lot of States have taken measures to inhibit the shipment of 
hazardous cargo on sea routes, on the basis of the safety deliberation applied to parts 
A and A-1 of Chapter VII of the 1974 SOLAS Convention, as amended. Ship 
security plans should have established procedures at all security levels to validate, 
maintain, and revise an abstract of any hazardous cargo or risky substances shipped, 
including their locations, and make provision for restricted areas and access, 
including to spaces containing dangerous goods or hazardous substances.  
 
5.1.2 Declaration of Security (DOS) 
The IMO maritime security measures also require Governments to determine 
when a Declaration of Security (DOS)—which is an agreement between a port or 
port facility and a ship or between a ship and another ship that confirms the security 
responsibilities of each party during a ship/port interface or a ship-to-ship activity—
is required.
75
 It is the responsibility of the respective security officers of the ship and 
port/port facility to assess whether those activities put human beings, environment, or 
possessions at risk. These circumstances are usually specified by the Designated 
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Authority or Administration for inclusion in port, port facility and ship security plans, 
which are then implemented in circumstances such as when the port facility/ship 
interface involves a cruise ship, a ship carrying hazardous cargo or the loading or 
transfer of them. 
 
5.1.3 International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code 
Launched in 1965, the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) 
Code “amplifies the requirements of both conventions and has become the standard 
guide to all aspects of handling dangerous goods and marine pollutants in sea 
transport”.76 Initially, the amended Code was suggested to governments as the 
ground for domestic supervisions; the influenced contents were the requirements of 
SOLAS 1974 and International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships (MARPOL) Annex III. But the amendments 32, 33, 34 and 35 are compulsory 
at present. There are basic principles enacted by the Code: elaborate 
recommendations for respective articles, materials, and substances, and several 
recommendations for sound operational practice, including guidance for emergency 
response action, labeling, packing, stowage, and buzzwords. 
 
5.1.4 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention 
The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988 SUA Convention) was amended by a 2005 
protocol (2005 SUA Protocol)
77
 which added a novel Article stating several charges 
concerning terror acts. Moreover, the 2005 protocol addresses the situation where a 
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vessel in international waters is carrying WMD and obliges States that have ratified it 
to “cooperate to bring the responsible person to justice”.78 These innovative charges 
relating to proliferation contain shipping “(a) explosive or radioactive materials, for 
the purpose of the intimidation or compulsion of a government or population, (b) 
biological, chemical and nuclear weapons (for any purpose), (c) special fissionable 
materials as defined by the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] 
with the knowledge that those materials are going to be used for any purpose not 
safeguarded by the IAEA, and (d) equipment, materials or software or related 
technology that significantly contributes to the design, manufacture or delivery of a 
[biological, chemical or nuclear] weapon, with the intention that it will be used for 
such purpose”.79 
In addition, the ship-boarding management has been developed by the 2005 
protocol. The amended SUA Convention includes new regulations over agreed ship-
boarding on high seas and claims States parties to “co-operate to the fullest extent 
possible to prevent and suppress unlawful acts covered by this Convention, in 
conformity with international law, and shall respond to requests pursuant to this 
article as expeditiously as possible”.80  
The precondition for ship-boarding is, of course, the cooperation and 
empowerment of the flag State. According to Tracy Peverett, head of maritime 
security section at the IMO, “A State party may notify the IMO Secretary-General 
that it would allow authorization to board and search a ship flying its flag, its cargo 
and persons on board if there is no response from the flag State within four hours; it 
can also notify that it authorizes a requesting party to board and search the ship, its 
cargo and persons on board, and to question the persons on board to determine if an 
offence has been, or is about to be, committed”.81 Every OEG member has not 
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registered or ratified the protocol, although the 2005 SUA Protocol is potentially 
useful at reaching the PSI’s aims. 
 
 
5.2 Recommendations for the IMO 
There is no requirement for PSI activities to come under the scrutiny of 
international bodies like the IMO. In the current absence of any customary law 
against WMD trafficking, and short of the unlikely adoption of an explicit UNSCR 
authorizing maritime interdiction, PSI participants are trying to keep increasing their 
impacts on detecting and taking over WMD and associated substances in their 
internal waters or own ports. While imposing more restrictions on the PSI’s 
interdictions might seem to be a step backward, the fact is that at this point, the PSI 
probably has more to gain from a broadened membership and international support 
than it does from executing interdictions that violate international norms 
guaranteeing the freedom of navigation. 
It is compelling that the PSI’s efficiency needs to be improved; for example, 
activating the PSI under the U.N. system can be one of the methods of improving its 
efficiency. Based on the outcome of the research, the IMO is encouraged to note 
following recommendations in order to achieve the coordination between its 
instruments and the PSI regime: 
 
i. There is a need for the IMO to offer the framework to facilitate sharing 
legal guidance among those nations that are seeking to strengthen their 
domestic legislation against proliferation. In addition, the IMO would be 
able to either make PSI activities operated in ranges of existent 
international law or perform as a ministry for amending it. 
ii. The WMD interdiction that supports the PSI can be advocated by the IMO. 
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As a neutral organization under U.N. auspices, the IMO could assess 
financing and judgment and give suggestions with regard to interdictions. 
To be specific, if the IMO can be recognized as fair, nonpartisan, objective, 
and transparent, it would be capable of answering key questions like what 
defines a maritime menace as well as what qualifies as “good cause” for 
interdiction.  
iii. It is recommended to offer the PSI a genuine framework with compatible 
strategies, methods of operation, and a budget to bridge gaps between 
intelligence collection endeavors and interdiction. For instance, if the IMO 
plays a role as a host of OEG meetings, it could promote a technology 
sharing where the PSI can engage in a win-win exchange with member 
States. The sharing of detection technology such as hand held radiation 
detectors, cargo scanners, and stand-off sensors can increase the 
effectiveness of PSI participants in screening port traffic. In that way, the 
IMO could advocate for and support developing, planning, and executing 
the PSI. 
iv. The PSI has elements where arranging conventions requires timely 
attention but doing so hastily is politically challenging and delicate. The 
IMO needs to aid the PSI in its efforts to fit in such specifically 
transnational issues. In addition, the IMO can help avoid disagreements 
and incorrect judgments which would delay action or hinder legitimate 
trades. 
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CHAPTER 6. Conclusion 
 
For sure, the PSI and other confirming efforts driven by the United States 
has improved the consciousness of the hazard and imminence of the troubles with 
shipments of illicit WMD has been improved by the PSI and other confirming efforts 
driven by the United States. Moreover, the core of interdiction has undoubtedly 
restrained a few trades in WMD, their shipment networks, and kindred substances as 
well as coerced deceptive traders into changing their strategies. PSI exercises have 
built up national capabilities for conformed search and interdiction of problematic 
shipping. The United States has successfully arranged ship-boarding agreements with 
some of the nations which have vessels flying all around the world. Accordingly, 
many countries have hoped for flag-State authorization for embarking to hunt for 
WMD. All that matters is that the PSI has elaborated and transformed from a concern 
about interdiction of vessels on the voyage to actual seizure of WMD and inspection 
in ports; for the United States, such a range of transformation may come up to 
disruption of monetary networks engaged or support for the trafficking. 
As the PSI demonstrates, cooperative maritime security efforts are easier to 
conceive and proselytize than to implement. Successful, effective, and efficient 
multilateral maritime security cooperation requires that key countries view their 
participation as both “legal” and in their direct national security interest. Another 
necessary condition is that the cooperation be led not by intimidation, but by reason 
and good example, and that it be as politically neutral as possible. This is why U.N. 
approval or, even better, U.N. facilitation and institutionalization of such efforts will 
enhance their chances for success. 
Furthermore, the PSI model has pushed the envelope in nuclear interdiction. 
A similar model was taken up by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
(GICNT). And, in April 2010, the Nuclear Security Summit informally worked on 
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developing unanimity about the goal of insuring all nuclear materials no later than 
2014. These initiatives fill up the existing nonproliferation regime as well as create 
an elaborate nuclear governance framework. Likewise, strengthening the PSI and 
embracing its model might advance concerns about preventing proliferation and offer 
a functional system to rally international initiative on major across-the-board 
problems. 
On the basis of the lessons learned over the past ten years, the 
recommendations for the IMO mentioned above are several examples of the kinds of 
steps that can be taken to enhance and reinvigorate the PSI. By achieving the 
coordination between the IMO instruments and the PSI regime, the PSI will become 
a more useful tool in the battle against proliferation for years to come and the 
effectiveness of the initiative will increase which will lead to attaining international 
maritime security. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix. The Statement of Interdiction Principles (SIP) 
 
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a response to the growing 
challenge posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their 
delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. The PSI builds on efforts by the 
international community to prevent proliferation of such items, including existing 
treaties and regimes. It is consistent with and a step in the implementation of the UN 
Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992, which states that the 
proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and 
underlines the need for member states of the UN to prevent proliferation. The PSI is 
also consistent with recent statements of the G8 and the European Union, 
establishing that more coherent and concerted efforts are needed to prevent the 
proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. PSI participants 
are deeply concerned about this threat and of the danger that these items could fall 
into the hands of terrorists, and are committed to working together to stop the flow of 
these items to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The PSI 
seeks to involve in some capacity all states that have a stake in nonproliferation and 
the ability and willingness to take steps to stop the flow of such items at sea, in the 
air, or on land. The PSI also seeks cooperation from any state whose vessels, flags, 
ports, territorial waters, airspace, or land might be used for proliferation purposes by 
states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The increasingly aggressive 
efforts by proliferators to stand outside or to circumvent existing nonproliferation 
norms, and to profit from such trade, requires new and stronger actions by the 
international community. We look forward to working with all concerned states on 
measures they are able and willing to take in support of the PSI, as outlined in the 
following set of "Interdiction Principles." 
 
PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to 
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establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop 
shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from 
states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal 
authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security 
Council. They call on all states concerned with this threat to, international peace and 
security to join in similarly committing to: 
1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, 
for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related 
materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. "States or 
non-state actors of proliferation concern" generally refers to those countries or 
entities that the PSI participants involved establish should be subject to interdiction 
activities because they are engaged in proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or 
acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or 
(2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, 
or related materials. 
2. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information 
concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting the confidential character of 
classified information provided by other states as part of this initiative, dedicate 
appropriate resources and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and 
maximize coordination among participants in interdiction efforts. 
3. Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities 
where necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen when 
necessary relevant international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to support 
these commitments. 
4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of 
WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national legal 
authorities permit and consistent with their obligations under international law and 
frameworks, to include: 
a) Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or from 
states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to allow any persons 
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subject to their jurisdiction to do so. 
b) At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by another 
state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their internal 
waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial sea of any other state, that is 
reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-state 
actors of proliferation concern, and to seize such cargoes that are identified. 
c) To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate 
circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other states, 
and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be 
identified by such states. 
d) To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal 
waters, territorial seas, of contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are 
reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of 
proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified; and (2) to enforce 
conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters or territorial seas 
that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as requiring that such 
vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry. 
e) At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by 
another state, to (a) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying such 
cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and that are 
transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are 
identified; and/or (b) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes 
transit rights through their airspace in advance of such flights. 
f) If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as trans-shipment points 
for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation 
concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably suspected 
of carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are identified. 
 
Source: US Department of State, ‘Proliferation Security Initiative: statement of 
interdiction principles’, 4 Sep. 2003, <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm>. 
